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Abstract 
This paper proposes that the distinctively human capacity for cumulative, adaptive, open-
ended cultural evolution came about through two temporally-distinct cognitive transitions. 
First, the origin of Homo-specific culture over two MYA was made possible by the onset of a 
finer-grained associative memory that allowed episodes to be encoded in greater detail. This 
in turn meant more overlap amongst the distributed representations of these episodes, such 
that they could more readily evoke one another through self-triggered recall (STR). STR 
enabled representational redescription, the chaining of thoughts and actions, and the capacity 
for a stream of thought. Second, fully cognitive modernity following the appearance of 
anatomical modernity after 200,000 BP, was made possible by the onset of contextual focus 
(CF): the ability to shift between an explicit convergent mode conducive to logic and 
refinement of ideas, and an implicit divergent mode conducive to free-association, viewing 
situations from radically new perspectives, concept combination, analogical thinking, and 
insight. This paved the way for an integrated, creative internal network of understandings, 
and behavioral modernity. We discuss feasible neural mechanisms for this two-stage 
proposal, and outline how STR and CF differ from other proposals. We provide 
computational evidence for the proposal obtained with an agent-based model of cultural 
evolution in which agents invent ideas for actions and imitate the fittest of their neighbors’ 
actions. Mean fitness and diversity of actions across the artificial society increased with STR, 
and even more so with CF, but CF was only effective if STR was already in place. CF was 
most effective following a change in task, which supports its hypothesized role in escaping 
mental fixation. The proposal is discussed in the context of transition theory in the life 
sciences. 
Keywords: behavioral modernity, cognitive transition, creativity, cultural evolution, dual 
process, origin of culture  
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Two Cognitive Transitions Underlying the Capacity for Cultural Evolution 
 
 Introduction 
Regardless of the extent to which any particular skill such as tool use, language, or mental 
state attribution is uniquely human, it would be difficult to argue that any other species 
remotely approaches the human capacity for the cultural evolution of novelty that is 
accumulative, adaptive, and open-ended (i.e., with no a priori limit on potential variation). 
Here, culture refers to extrasomatic adaptations—including behavior and technology—that 
are socially rather than sexually transmitted. This paper synthesizes research from 
anthropology, psychology, archaeology, and agent-based modeling into a speculative yet 
coherent account of the cognitive transitions underlying human cultural evolution. 
Archaeological evidence refers here to the ‘material correlates’ or ‘precipitates’ of 
behavior. Its interpretation has a long and complex philosophical history. While earlier 
approaches tended to treat artifacts as indicators of varieties of ‘progress’, ‘conditional 
cognitive archaeology’ approaches (sensu Haidle, 2009 and Wragg-Sykes, 2015) seek to 
reveal the cognitive conditions responsible for artifacts (and other material precipitates of 
behavior). We share this more contemporary approach to understanding the ‘mind behind the 
artifact’. 
We note that there is to some extent a trade-off in the literature between theories based 
on historical data, and theories that are cognitively sophisticated. This paper aims to 
synthesize these approaches, using archaeological data and anthropological research as the 
point of departure for a proposal that is consistent with contemporary psychology. Note also 
that our theoretical approach is founded on evolutionary principles, but not those of the 
evolutionary psychology approach of Tooby and Cosmides (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Sell 
et al, 2009). We take a contemporary conception of evolution that incorporates sociality, 
individual behavioral variation, agency, and creativity, as opposed to viewing individuals as 
slaves to fitness equations. 
Evolutionary Transitions 
Evolutionary processes have multiple modes and tempos (Stanley 1979; Gould 2002), and 
often generate unexpected outcomes due to nonlinear interactions between such information 
levels as genotype, phenotype, environment, and even developmental characteristics (Galis & 
Metz, 2007). In cognitive evolution, evidence of significant change might well be ’smeared’ 
over time and space for many reasons, including lag between initial appearance and demic 
diffusion, ambiguities in the archaeological and fossil records, and other factors. We suggest 
that the theory of evolutionary transitions can provide a useful framework for understanding 
the cognitive changes culminating in behavioral modernity (BM). 
Transitions are common in biological evolution (Szathmary & Maynard Smith, 1995) 
and transition research unpacks fuzzier terms such ‘adaptation due to natural selection’, 
aiming “…to analyze trends of increasing complexity” (Griesmer, 2000), and explain the 
origins of new varieties of information organization. Szathmary and Maynard-Smith’s 
account of the eight major transitions in the history of life remains widely accepted today 
(Calcott & Sterelny, 2011), with other transitions continuing to be identified, including the 
evolution of new sexes (Parker, 2004), and new varieties of ant agriculture (Schultz & Brady, 
2008), animal individuality (Godfrey-Smith 2011), metabolism and cell structure (DeLong et 
al., 2010), technology (Geels, 2000) and hominin socialization (Foley & Gamble 2009). 
Research on the dynamics (e.g., rates and types) of evolutionary transitions shows that 
despite their variety they exhibit common features: they are (1) rare, (2) involve new levels of 
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organization of information, (3) followed by diversification, and (4) incomplete (Wilson 
2010). Szathmary and Maynard-Smith include the transition from “primate societies to 
human societies ” as part of their “Extended Evolutionary Synthesis” (Wilson, 2010), but this 
synthesis was formulated just prior to the beginnings of explicitly evolutionary approaches to 
modern cognition. 
In this paper we explore two such transitions. The first, discussed in section 2, is the 
origin of a richer, post-Pan, post-Australopithecine culture as early as 2.2 million years ago 
(Harmand et al., 2015). The second, discussed in section 3, is the explosion of creative 
culture in the Middle/Upper Paleolithic. Section 4 summarizes simulations carried out using 
an agent-based model aimed at investigating whether the proposed mechanisms do in fact 
enhance the capacity for cultural evolution as proposed. 
 A First Cognitive Transition 
We begin with the archaeological and anthropological evidence for a second transition, 
followed by our proposed cognitive explanation, and a comparison to other proposals. 
Evidence for a First Cognitive Transition 
The minds of Australopithecus and earliest Homo have been referred to as episodic because 
there is no evidence that their experience deviated substantially from the present or very near-
time moment of concrete sensory perceptions. Their archaeological record of simple stone 
(and some bone and antler) implements indicates that they encoded perceptions of events in 
memory—an information-handling capacity that supplies “timely information to the 
organism’s decision-making systems” (Klein et al., 2002, p. 306)—but had little voluntary 
access to memories without external cues, which meant minimal innovation and artifact 
variation. 
This is reflected in the early archaeological record, beginning with stone tools from 
Lomekwi 3 West Turkana, Kenya, 3.3 mya (Harmand et al., 2015), and characterized by 
opportunism in highly restricted environments (Braun et al., 2008). Tools were 
technologically on par with those of modern chimpanzees (Byrne, 2005; Blackwell & 
d’Errico, 2001; see Read (2008) and Fuentes (2015) for cognitive considerations of 
chimpanzee toolmaking). These tools also lack evidence of symbolism (d’Errico et al., 2003), 
and were transported relatively short distances across landscapes (Potts, 2012). While nut-
cracking and other simple tool use outside Homo may involve the sequential chaining of 
actions, and thus the sequential chaining of the mental representations underlying these 
actions, outside Homo this kind of processing does not occur with sufficient frequency or 
diversity to cross the threshold to to engage in abstract thought (see Gabora & Steel, 2017 for 
a mathematical model of what is needed for this threshold to be crossed). Thus, the evidence 
suggests that the ability of early Homo to voluntarily shape, modify, or practice skills and 
actions was at best negligible, and they could not invent or refine complex actions, gestures, 
or vocalizations. 
Early Homo evolved into a variety of forms, including H. erectus, dating between 2.8 - 
0.3 million years ago (Villmoare et al. 2015). Multiple lines of evidence suggest a shift away 
from biology and towards culture as the primary means of adaption in this lineage, attended 
by significant cultural elaboration. Having expanded out from Africa as early as 2 mya, 
Homo constructed tools involving more production steps and more varied raw materials 
(Haidle, 2009), imposed symmetry on tool stone (Lepre et al., 2011), used and controlled fire 
(Goren-Inbar et al., 2004), ranked moderately high among predators (Plummer, 2004), 
crossed stretches of open water up to 20 km (Gibbons 1998), ranged as far north as latitude 
52◦ (Parfitt et al., 2010), revisited campsites possibly for seasons at a time, sometimes built 
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shelters (Mania & Mania 2005), and transported tool stone over greater distances than their 
predecessors (Moutsou, 2014). 
It is widely believed that these signs of a culture richer than that of Pan or 
Australopithecus c. 1.7 mya reflect a transition in cognitive and/or social characteristics 
significantly beyond the small-space, short-time episodic ‘bubble’ of earlier minds. While the 
cranial capacity of Homo erectus was approximately 1,000 cc—about 25% larger than that of 
Homo habilis, at least twice as large as that of living great apes, and 75% that of modern 
humans (Aiello, 1996)—brain volume alone cannot explain these developments, which imply 
an important cognitive transition. 
 Background to Proposed Cognitive Mechanism Underlying First Transition 
Because the cognition of Homo habilis was primarily restricted to the “here and now” of the 
present moment, Donald (1991) refers to it as an episodic mode of cognitive functioning. He 
proposed that with the enlarged cranial capacity of later early Homo, the hominin mind 
underwent a transition to a new mode of cognitive functioning made possible by the onset of 
what he calls a self-triggered recall and rehearsal loop, which we abbreviate STR. STR 
enabled hominins to voluntarily retrieve stored memories independent of environmental cues 
(sometimes referred to as ‘autocuing’) and engage in RR (representational redescription) and 
the refinement of thoughts and ideas. Donald referred to this new kind of mind as the 
‘mimetic mind’ because it could act out or ‘mime’ events that occurred in the past or that 
could occur in the future, thereby not only temporarily escaping the present, but through 
mime or gesture communicating the escape to others. 
STR also enabled attention to be directed away from the external world toward ones’ 
internal representations, which paved the way for abstract thought. We use the term abstract 
thought to refer to the processing of previously assimilated experiences, as in occurs 
counterfactual thinking, planning, or creativity, as opposed to direct perception of the 
concrete ‘here and now’ (for a review of abstract thought, see Barsalou, 2005). Note that in 
much of the cultural evolution literature, social learning is contrasted with individual 
learning, which involves learning for oneself, and novelty is attributed to things like copying 
error (e.g., Henrich & Boyd, 2002; Mesoudi, Whiten & Laland, 2006; Rogers, 1988). 
Abstract thought and creativity, if mentioned at all, are equated with individual learning. 
However, they are not the same thing. Individual learning deals with obtaining pre-existing 
information from the environment through non-social means (e.g., learning to predict weather 
patterns by watching the clouds). In contrast, abstract thought involves mental processing of 
internally derived contents, and when this results in the generation of useful or pleasing ideas, 
behavior, or artifacts that did not previously exist, it is said to be creative. Thus, in the case of 
individual learning, the information comes from the external world, while in the case of 
abstract thought, it is internally generated. Indeed, there is increasing recognition of the 
extent to which creative outcomes are contingent upon internally driven incremental/iterative 
processing (Basadur, 1995; Chan & Schunn, 2015; Feinstein, 2006; Gabora, 2017). 
Note that Donald’s explanation focuses on neither technical nor social abilities but on a 
cognitive trait that could facilitate both. STR enabled systematic evaluation and improvement 
of thoughts and motor acts by adapting them to new situations, resulting in voluntary 
rehearsal and refinement of skills and artifacts. STR also broadened the scope of social 
activities to include pantomime and re-enactive play. 
 Proposed Cognitive Mechanism Underlying First Transition 
Leaving aside alternatives to Donald’s proposal until the end of this section, for now we note 
that although Donald’s explanation seems reasonable so far as it goes, it does not explain why 
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larger brain size enabled STR. What was taking place at the at the level of associative 
memory that made STR possible? In what follows, we contextualize Donald’s (1991) 
generally well received but sketchy theoretical schema in more current literature. Building on 
Donald’s proposal that the cognitive abilities of modern Homo are due to an accumulation of 
modes of representation post-Pan starting with the onset of STR, we will ground the concept 
of STR in a neural level account of the mechanisms underlying cognitive flexibility and 
creativity (Gabora, 2010; Gabora & Ranjan, 2013). 
We start by summarizing a few well-known features of associative memory. Each 
neuron is sensitive to a primitive stimulus attribute, or microfeature, such as lines of a 
particular orientation, or sounds of a particular pitch. Items in memory are distributed across 
cell assemblies of such neurons; thus each neuron participates in the encoding of many items. 
Memory is also content-addressable: there is a systematic relationship between the content of 
an item and the neurons that encode it; thus, items that share microfeatures may be encoded 
in overlapping distributions of neurons. 
We propose that, while in and of itself increased brain volume does not explain the 
origin of BM, larger brains enabled a transition from more coarse-grained to more fine-
grained memory. The smaller the number of neurons a brain has to work with, the fewer 
attributes of any given item it can encode, and less able it is to forge associations on the basis 
of shared attributes. Conversely, the evolution of a more fine-grained memory meant that 
representations could be encoded in more detail, i.e., distributed across larger sets of cell 
assemblies containing more neurons. Since the memory organization was content addressable 
that meant more ways in which distributed representations could meaningfully overlap. 
Greater overlap enabled more routes by which one memory could evoke another. This 
in turn made possible the onset of STR, and paved the way for the capacity to engage in 
recursive recall and streams of abstract thought, and a limited kind of insight (Gabora, 2002, 
2010; Gabora & Ranjan, 2013). To take a simple example, the reason that the experience of 
being accidentally punctured by a thorn could potentially play a role in the invention of an 
arrowhead is that both the thorn wound and hunting experiences involve overlap in the set of 
relevant attributes (i.e., “pointed”, “flesh”, “tear”), and thus overlap of activated cell 
assemblies. 
Representations could now be reprocessed until they achieved a form that was 
acceptably consistent with existing understandings or sufficiently enabled goals and desires 
to be achieved (Gabora, 1998). This scenario provides a plausible neural-level account of 
Donald’s (1991) proposal that abstract thought was a natural consequence of possessing a 
self-triggered recall and rehearsal loop, which was made possible by the increase in brain size 
at this time. 
 Comparison to Other Theories 
We now compare this theory to prominent theories concerning the cognitive underpinnings of 
the origin of rich, post-Australopithecine culture. 
Some theories attribute the origins of rich, post-Australopithecus culture to social 
factors. Foley and Gamble (2009) place the emphasis on enhanced family bonding and the 
capacity for a more focused style of concentration, further enhanced by controlled use of fire 
by at least 400,000 years ago. Wiessner (2014) suggests that fire not only enabled the 
preparation of healthier food, but by providing light after dark, facilitated playful and 
imaginative social bonding. Others emphasize an extrication from biologically based to 
culturally based kinship networks (Leaf & Read, 2012; Read, 2012; Read & van der Leeuw, 
2015). We believe that these social explanations are essentially correct, but that they have 
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their origin in cognitive changes, which altered not only social interactions but interactions 
with other facets of human experience as well. 
Our proposal bears some resemblance to Hauser et al.’s (2002) suggestion that what 
distinguishes human cognition from that of other species is the capacity for recursion, Penn et 
al.’s (2008) concept of relational reinterpretation, and Read’s (2009) claim that relational 
concepts and recursive reasoning allowed for a conceptually based system of social relations 
but may have evolved in conjunction with non-social activities such as toolmaking. While our 
proposal is consistent with this, it goes further, by grounding the onset of recursive reasoning 
in a transition in the structure of associating memory. Read suggests that recursive reasoning 
was made possible by larger working memory, while we argue that larger working memory 
in and of itself is not useful; it must goes hand-in-hand with (and indeed is a natural 
byproduct of) more fine-grained memory. As a simple example, let us suppose that a hominid 
with a coarse-grained memory increased its working memory from being able to think only of 
one thing at a time (e.g., a thorn) to two (e.g., a thorn and the sun). This would generally be a 
source of confusion. However, if it held only one thing in mind at a time but encoded it in 
richer detail (e.g., incorporating attributes of a thorn such as ‘sharp’, ‘pointy’, ‘thin’, and so 
forth), it could forge meaningful associations with other items based on these attributes (e.g., 
other sharp things or pointy things). 
Our proposal also bears some resemblance to Chomsky’s (2012) concept of ‘merge’. 
However, while ‘merge’ is described as the forging of associations between items that are 
extremely similar, or that co-occur in time or space, STR can additionally forge associations 
between items that are related by as few as a single attribute, and do so recursively such that 
the output of one such operation is the input for the next, and reliably, such that encodings are 
modified in light of each other in the course of streams of thought (Gabora, 2002, 2013, 2017, 
2018). (Detailed examples—including the invention of a fence made of skis on the basis of 
the attributes ‘tall’, ‘skinny’ and ‘sturdy’ (Gabora, 2010), and the generation of the idea of a 
beanbag chair on the basis of the single attribute ‘conforms to shape’ (Gabora, 2018)—are 
provided elsewhere.) 
Thus, while merge forges associations based on overall similarity, for STR the memory 
must be sufficiently fine-grained (i.e., items must be encoded in enough detail) that the 
associative process can operate on the basis of specific attributes to which specific neurons 
are tuned. Thus our proposal (but not ‘merge’) offers a causal link between brain size and 
cognitive ability, i.e., more neurons means they can be tuned to a wider range of attributes 
and thereby form more associations on the basis of shared attributes. 
Mithen’s (1996) model features the accumulation and overlap of a variety of 
intelligence modules. Although in its details his model runs rather counter to much current 
thinking including our own, his focus on cognitive fluidity and creativity influenced the 
model proposed here. 
A Second Cognitive Transition 
As with the first transition, we begin with the archaeological and anthropological evidence 
for a second transition, followed by our proposed cognitive explanation, and finally a 
comparison to other proposals. 
Evidence for a Second Transition 
The African archaeological record indicates that another significant cultural transition 
occurred approximately 100,000 years ago, bearing many of the material correlates of BM. 
Though defining BM is somewhat difficult (d’Errico et al., 2005; Shea 2011), prehistorians 
generally agree that BM is evidenced in the archaeological record by a spatially and 
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temporally quite disparate suite of artifacts and characteristics including (a) artifacts 
indicating personal symbolic ornamentation (d’Errico et al., 2009), (b) elaborate burial sites 
indicating ritual (Hovers, Ilani, Bar-Yosef, & Vandermeersch, 2003) and possibly religion 
(Rappaport, 1999), (c) a radical proliferation of tool types that better fit tools to specific tasks 
(McBrearty & Brooks, 2000), (d) ‘cave art’, i.e., representational imagery featuring 
depictions of animals (Pike et al., 2012) and human beings (Nelson, 2008), (e) complex 
hearths and highly structured use of living spaces (Otte, 2012), (f) extensive use of bone and 
antler tools, sometimes with engraved designs, and (g) calorie-gathering intensification that 
included widespread use of aquatic resources (Erlandson, 2001). BM spread out of Africa 
sometime after 100,000 years ago, and was present in Sub-Himalayan Asia and Australasia 
over 50,000 years ago (Mulvaney & Kamminga, 1999) and Continental Europe not long 
thereafter (Mellars, 2006). 
Whether this archaeological record reflects a genuine transition resulting in BM is hotly 
debated because claims to this effect are based on the European Paleolithic record, and 
largely exclude the lesser-known African record (Fisher & Ridley, 2013). Many artifacts 
associated with a rapid transition to BM 40,000-50,000 years ago in Europe are found in the 
African Middle Stone Age tens of thousands of years earlier, which pushes the cultural 
transition more closely into chronological alignment with the transition to anatomical 
modernity between 200,000 and 100,000 BP. Nevertheless, it is clear that modern behavior 
appeared in Africa between 100,000 to 50,000 years ago, and spread, resulting in 
displacement of the Neanderthals in Europe (Fisher & Ridley, 2013). Subsequently, the 
cultures of Homo sapiens were radically more open-ended and accumulative, meaning that 
they could archive effectively infinite amounts of information to be used in adaptation, one of 
the adaptive advantages of complex culture. Despite a lack of overall increase in cranial 
capacity, the prefrontal cortex, and more particularly the orbitofrontal region, increased 
significantly in size (Dunbar 1993), in what was most likely a time of major neural 
reorganization (Morgan 2013). 
 Proposed Cognitive Mechanism Underlying Second Transition 
Given that behaviorally modern humans were demonstrably more creative than any prior 
hominin (Mithen, 1998), what role could changes at the cognitive level have played in their 
evolution? 
We propose that the cultural explosion of the Middle/Upper Paleolithic came about due 
to fine-tuning of the biochemical mechanisms underlying the capacity to spontaneously shift 
between different modes of thought depending on the situation by varying the specificity of 
the activated memory region. The ability to shift between different modes is referred to as 
contextual focus (CF) because it requires the capacity to focus or defocus attention in 
response to contextual factors (Gabora, 2003), such as the audience, or level of danger, or 
goals, which may shift minute by minute if goals are broken into subgoals. Focused attention 
is conducive to analytical thought (Agnoli, Franchin, Rubaltelli, & Corazza, 2015; Vartanian, 
2009; Zabelina, 2018). In analytic thought, the activation of memory is constrained enough to 
hone in and mentally operate on only the relevant aspects of the contents of thought. In 
contrast, by diffusely activating a wide region of memory, defocused attention is conducive 
to associative thought; it enables more obscure (but potentially relevant) aspects of the 
situation to come into play. This greatly enhances the potential for insight, i.e., the forging of 
obscure but useful or relevant connections. 
Once the products of one mode of thought could become ‘ingredients’ for the other, 
they could reflect on the contents of their mind not just from different perspectives but at 
different levels of granularity, from basic level concepts (e.g., deer) up to abstract concepts 
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(e.g., animal) and down to more detailed levels (e.g., legs), as well as conceive of their 
interrelationships. All this was necessary in order to have a need to come up with names for 
these things, i.e., develop complex languages. Thus, it is proposed that CF paved the way for 
not just language but a range of cognitive abilities considered by anthropologists to be 
diagnostic of BM. Note that associative thought is useful for breaking out of a rut, but would 
be risky without the ability to reign it back in; basic survival related tasks may be impeded if 
everything is reminding you of everything else. Therefore, it seems reasonable that it would 
take considerable time to fine-tune the mechanisms underlying the capacity to spontaneously 
shift between these two processing modes such that one retained the benefits of escaping 
local minima without running the risk of being perpetually side-tracked. The time needed to 
fine-tune this could potentially be the explanation for the lag between anatomical and BM.  
Comparison to Other Theories 
We now review some prevailing hypotheses for how and why BM and its underlying 
intellectual capacities arose. 
Our proposal is superficially similar to the idea that what distinguishes human 
cognition from that of other species is our capacity for dual processing (Evans, 2008; Nosek, 
2007). Dual processing posits that humans engage in not just a primitive implicit Type 1 
mode for free association and fast “gut responses", but also an explicit Type 2 mode for 
deliberate analysis. However, while dual processing makes the split between older, more 
automatic processes and newer, more deliberate processes, CF makes the split between an 
older associative mode based on relationships of correlation and a newer analytic mode based 
on relationships of causation. We propose that although earlier hominids relied on the older 
association-based system, because their memories were coarser-grained, there were fewer 
routes for meaningful associations, so there was less associative processing of previous 
experiences. Therefore, items encoded in memory tended to remain in the same form as when 
they were originally assimilated; rather than engaging in associative or analytic processing of 
previously assimilated material, there was greater tendency to focus on the here and now. 
Thus, while dual processing theory attributes abstract, hypothetical thinking to the more 
recent Type 2 mode, according to the CF hypothesis it is possible in either mode but differs in 
character in the two modes (logically constructed arguments in the analytic mode versus 
flights of fancy in the associative mode). The CF hypothesis is rooted in a distinction in the 
creativity literature between (1) associative (divergent) processes said to predominate during 
idea generation, and (2) analytic convergent processes said to predominate during the 
refinement, implementation, and testing of an idea (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992). (See 
Sowden, Pringle, & Gabora (2014), for a comparison and discussion of the relationship dual 
processing theory and dual theories of creativity; see Gabora, 2018 for discussion of the 
distinction between associative versus divergent thought). 
To see how the onset of CF could give rise to open-ended cultural complexity, recall 
the previously-mentioned properties of associative memory: distributed representation, coarse 
coding, and content addressability. Each thought may activate more or fewer cell assemblies 
depending on the nature of the task at hand. Focused attention is conducive to analytic 
thought because memory activation is constrained enough to zero in and operate on the most 
defining properties. Defocused attention, by diffusely activating a diversity of memory 
locations, is conducive to associative thought; obscure (but potentially relevant) properties of 
the situation come into play (Gabora, 2000, 2010). Thus, while in an analytic mode of 
thought the concept TOOL might only activate ‘hand axe’, in an associative mode of thought, 
all sorts of items in ones’ environment might potentially be used as a tool depending on what 
one wants to accomplish. Once it was possible to shift between these modes of thought, 
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cognitive processes requiring either analytic thought, associative thought or both could be 
carried out more effectively, and the fruits of one mode of thought could become ingredients 
for the other mode, thereby facilitating the forging of a richly integrated creative internal 
network of understandings about the world and one’s place in it, which we refer to as a 
worldview1. This in turn set in motion behavioral modernity. Thus, the notion that diffuse 
activation is conducive to associative thought while activation of a narrow receptive field is 
conducive to analytic thought is consistent with the architecture of associative memory, and 
suggests a means by which CF made possible the capacity to stay on task, yet, when needed, 
forge unusual yet relevant connections. Language enhanced not just the ability to 
communicate and collaborate (thereby accelerating the pace of cultural innovation), but also 
the ability to think ideas through for oneself and manipulate them in a controlled, deliberate 
manner. 
In short, we propose that the emergence of a self-organizing worldview required two 
transitions, as illustrated schematically in Figure 1. The onset of STR over 2 mya (as 
discussed above) allowed rehearsal and refinement of skills and made possible minor 
modifications of representations. The onset of CF approximately 100,000 years ago made it 
possible to forge larger bridges through conceptual space that paved the way for innovations 
specifically tailored to selective pressures. It enabled a cultural version of what Gould and 
Vrba (1982) termed exaptation, the phenomenon wherein an existing trait is co-opted for a 
new function (Gabora, Scott, & Kauffman, 2013). Exaptation of representations and ideas 
dramatically enhanced the ability to, not just cope with the technological and social spheres 
of life, but develop individualized perspectives and unique worldviews conducive to fulfilling 
complementary social roles. This increase in cognitive variation provided the raw material for 
better adaptive fit to selective pressures. 
Mithen (1996) proposed that the integration of previously-compartmentalized 
intelligence modules–specialized for natural history, technology, socialization and language–
lay at the heart of BM. That integration is said to have enabled cognitive fluidity: the capacity 
to combine concepts and adapt ideas to new contexts, and thereby explore, map, and 
transform conceptual spaces across different knowledge systems. Fauconnier and Turner 
(2002) emphasize the benefit of cognitive fluidity for the capacity to draw and understand 
analogies. Our proposal is consistent with these explanations, but goes beyond them by 
showing how conceptual fluidity arises naturally as a function of the capacity to, when 
needed, shift to a more associative mode of processing. 
There are many variants of the theory BM reflects onset of sophisticated language 
abilities. Corballis (2011) suggests that this may have entailed a transition from a 
predominantly gestural to a vocal form of communication. Although the ambiguity of the 
archaeological evidence makes it difficult to know exactly when language began (Davidson 
& Noble 1989; Christiansen & Kirby, 2003; Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch, 2002),’it is widely 
believed—based on stone tool symmetry and complexity of manufacture—that as long ago as 
c. 1.7 million years Homo used gestural and prelinguistic vocalization communications that 
would have shared some organizational similarities with modern humans insofar as they 
differed significantly from other primate communications". The evolution of grammatically- 
and syntactically-modern language is generally placed (depending on whether one is 
observing it in Africa, sub-Himalayan Asia or Western Eurasia) after about 100,000 years 
ago, around the start of the Upper Palaeolithic (Bickerton, 2014; Dunbar, 1993; Tomasello, 
1999). 
                                                      
1 Our concept of worldview is closely aligned with what Read (2013) refers to as a ’cultural idea 
system’. 
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Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the proposed cognitive transitions resulting in behavioral 
modernity. Over time cognitive features undergo transitions from earlier to later states; 
different features are involved in transitions 1 and 2, which are separated by over a million 
years, with cognition evolving in a mosaic fashion. 
Bickerton (2014) proposes that BM entailed a series of stages (sensu Szathmary, 2015), 
though he focuses more specifically on language. In his view, open-ended cultural evolution 
began with selection for brain mechanisms underlying cognitive reorganization, ‘offline 
thinking’, and the elaboration and ‘ratcheting’ (cf Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner, 1993) of 
cultural information. Deacon (1997) emphasizes onset of the capacity to internally represent 
complex, abstract, internally coherent systems of meaning using symbols. Carstairs-
McCarthy (1999) suggests that some form of syntax was present in the earliest languages, but 
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most of the later elaboration, including recursive embedding of syntactic structure, evolved 
with BM. It is widely accepted that syntax constituted a crucial step toward BM, as it made it 
possible to state more precisely how elements are related, and embed them in other elements 
(Bickerton & Szathmáry, 2009). Thus, syntax enabled language to become general-purpose 
and applied in a variety of situations, highly unlike the situation-specific communication that 
has been observed in other species such as vervet monkeys. Donald (1991) proposed a 
transition in the mode of representation, enabling the capacity for narrative myth, as the 
underwrite of BM. Once again, our proposal is consistent with the idea that complex 
language abilities lie at the heart of BM, but because STR followed by CF would have 
enabled hominids to not just recursively refine and modify thoughts but consider them from 
different perspectives at different hierarchical levels, it would have stage the stage for 
complex language and facilitated the weaving of experiences into stories, parables, and 
broader conceptual frameworks, thereby integrating knowledge and experience (see also, 
Gabora & Aerts, 2009). 
Another proposal is that recursion, featuring “the [cognitive] creation of sequences or 
[thought] structures of unbound length or complexity” enabled mental time travel, distinctly-
human cognition, and BM (Corballis, 2011, p. 5-6; see also Suddendorf et al., 2009). 
Proponents note the limited use of recursion in Pan, for instance, but its centrality in modern 
human cognition. Corballis suggests that recursion allowed for self-actuated recall of past 
episodes (analogous to Donald’s ‘autocuing’) and cognitive models of possible futures, 
resulting in not just deeper individual bonding and information sharing but also “deeper 
levels of Machiavellian intrigue” (Corballis, 2011, p. 222). For reasons outlined earlier, we 
believe that recursive reasoning came about well before BM, though the ability to shift 
between different modes of thought using CF would have brought on the capacity to make 
vastly better use of it. 
Another proposal is that BM arose due to onset of the capacity to model the contents of 
other minds, sometimes referred to as ‘Theory of Mind’ (Tomasello, 2014). Tomasello 
further proposes that this resulted in “shared intentionality”, involving exchange of 
knowledge and goals, and potentially accentuation of group concerns over those of the 
individual, paving the way for social selection favoring cohesive groups. 
This explanation for BM is somewhat underwritten by recursion—in other words, the 
mechanism that allows for recursion is required for modeling the contents of other minds—
but the emphasis is on the social impact of recursion, rather than the capacity for recursion 
itself. Other social-ecological theories emphasize different factors. Whiten (2011) emphasizes 
a gradual increase in the complexity of social learning processes leading to the generation and 
ratcheting of richer, more diverse cultural traditions and extrasomatic culture. Foley and 
Gamble (2009) examined the ‘ecology of [hominin] social transitions’; it is in their fifth 
transition (after 200,000 BP) that BM ‘appears’. Our proposal is consistent with explanations 
that stress the onset of social abilities, but places these explanations in a broader framework 
by suggesting a mechanism that aided not just social skills but other skills (e.g., 
technological) as well. 
While most of these explanations are correct insofar as they go, we suggest that none of 
them go sufficiently to the root of the matter. As Carl Woese wrote of science at large 
“...sometimes [there is] no single best representation... only deeper understanding, more 
revealing and enveloping representations,” (Woese 2004:173). We propose that the second 
cognitive transition necessary for cumulative, adaptive, open-ended cultural evolution was 
the onset of CF, because once hominids could adapt their mode of thought to the situation 
they were in, and sculpt the output of such thought processes by subjecting them to different 
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perspectives, and different levels of analysis, their initially fragmented mental models of their 
world could be woven into more coherent mental models of their world—i.e., worldviews— 
which facilitated not just conceptual fluidity, creative problem-solving, and survival, skills 
but also interactive social exchange and more complex social structures. We add that the 
explanation proposed here is the only one we are aware of that grew out of a synthesis of 
archaeological and anthropological data with theories and research from both psychology and 
neuroscience. In addition, it is supported by computational simulations, to which we turn 
next. 
5. Simulation of Two Cultural Transitions 
We have reviewed the evidence for two hypotheses: (1) the earliest signs of culture were due 
to the onset of STR, which enabled representational redescription and abstract thought, and 
(2) the cultural explosion of the Middle-Upper Paleolithic was due to the onset of CF. We 
now summarize support for the hypothesis that these abilities played vital roles in the arrival 
of behavioural modernity and cultural evolution obtained using an agent-based model of 
cultural evolution referred to as “EVOlution of Culture”, abbreviated EVOC. EVOC uses 
neural network based agents that (1) invent new ideas, (2) imitate actions implemented by 
neighbors, (3) evaluate ideas, and (4) implement successful ideas as actions. EVOC is an 
elaboration of Meme and Variations, or MAV (Gabora, 1995), the earliest computer program 
to our knowledge to model not just cultural transmission but cumulative, adaptive, cultural 
evolution.2 
The goal behind EVOC (and MAV) was to distill the underlying logic of cultural 
evolution. As such, it is a vastly simplified model, much simpler than models of language 
evolution (e.g., Steels, 2012). Agents do not evolve in a biological sense—they neither die 
nor have offspring—but do in a cultural sense, by cumulatively modifying each others’ ideas 
for actions. Results obtained with this model may or may not tell us something about what is 
going on in the real world, but it allows us to vary one parameter while holding others 
constant and thereby test otherwise untestable hypotheses. This approach is particularly 
useful for studies at the interface between anthropology and psychology due to the sparseness 
of the pre-modern archaeological record. Although methods for analyzing these remains are 
becoming increasingly sophisticated, they cannot always distinguish amongst competing 
theories. Thus, computational models can be particularly valuable, providing a means of 
assessing the feasibility of theories concerning the origins of behaviorally modern cognition. 
 
4.1 The Computational Model 
We summarize the architecture of EVOC in sufficient detail to explain our results; for details 
see (e.g., Leijnen & Gabora, 2009). 
Agents. Agents consist of (1) an auto associative neural network, which encodes ideas 
for actions and detects trends in what constitutes a fit action, (2) a ‘perceptual system’, which 
carries out the evaluation and imitation of neighbors’ actions, and (3) a body, consisting of 
six body parts which implement actions. The neural network is composed of six input nodes 
and six corresponding output nodes that represent concepts of body parts (LEFT ARM, 
RIGHT ARM, LEFT LEG, RIGHT LEG, HEAD, and HIPS), as well as hidden nodes that 
represent more abstract concepts (LEFT, RIGHT, ARM, LEG, SYMMETRY, OPPOSITE, 
and MOVEMENT). Input nodes and output nodes are connected to hidden nodes of which 
                                                      
2  The approach can thus be contrasted with computer models of how individual learning affects 
biological evolution (e.g., Higgs 2000; Hinton & Nowlan 1987; Hutchins & Hazelhurst 1991). 
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they are instances (e.g., LEFT ARM is connected to LEFT.) Activation of any input node 
activates the MOVEMENT node. Same-direction activation of symmetrical input nodes (e.g., 
upward motion–of both arms) activates the SYMMETRY node. Further details concerning 
the neural network are provided in appendix A. 
Invention. An idea for a new action is a pattern consisting of six elements that dictate 
the placement of the six body parts. Agents generate new actions by modifying their initial 
action or an action that has been invented previously or acquired through imitation. During 
invention, the pattern of activation on the output nodes is fed back to the input nodes, and 
invention is biased according to the activations of the SYMMETRY and MOVEMENT 
hidden nodes. (Were this not the case there would be no benefit to using a neural network.) 
To invent a new idea, for each node of the idea currently represented on the input layer of the 
neural network, the agent makes a probabilistic decision as to whether the position of that 
body part will change, and if it does, the direction of change is stochastically biased 
according to the learning rate. If the new idea has a higher fitness than the currently 
implemented idea, the agent learns and implements the action specified by that idea. 
Imitation. The process of finding a neighbor to imitate works through a form of lazy 
(non-greedy) search. The imitating agent randomly scans its neighbors, and adopts the first 
action that is fitter than the action it is currently implementing. If it does not find a neighbor 
that is executing a fitter action than its own current action, it continues to execute the current 
action. 
Evaluation: The Fitness Function. Fitness was evaluated using an adaptation of the 
Royal Roads fitness function (Forrest & Mitchell, 1993). Definitions of terms used in the 
evaluation of the fitness of an action are provided in Table 1. The first fitness function is 
determined by 45 templates. The second fitness function is constructed analogously but with 
different sub-actions. The templates can be thought of as defining the cultural significance of 
types of sub-actions (such as dance steps). 
Each template Ti consists of six components, one for each body part (i.e., Ti = tij; j = 
1..6). Each body part can be in a neutral position (0) , up (1), down (-1), or an unspecified 
position (*). Six examples of templates are provided in Table 2. For example, in template Ti = 
∗, 1, −1, ∗, ∗, 0, the left arm is up (LA:1), the right arm is down (RA:-1), the hips are in the 
neutral position (HP:0), and the positions of other body parts is unspecified (HD:*, LL:*, and 
RL:*). The templates provide constraints, as well as flexibility with respect to what 
constitutes a fit action. For example, in an optimally fit action, the head must be in the neutral 
position (in Ti the first component is 0) but the positions of other body parts can vary). 
Details of the calculation of the fitness of an action are provided in appendix B. The 
fitness functions are difficult to solve because they are rugged, consisting of many peaks and 
valleys; hill-climbing is not guaranteed to lead to an optimal solution. There are multiple 
fitness peaks, that must be crossed before reaching the plateau. For example, consider the 
fitness function given in Table 2. The action 0,0,0,0,0,0 has a fitness of 6. An agent may 
move on from this action to find an actions that fits the third order templates with a fitness of 
31, e.g., F(D) : {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0} = 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 1 = 31. Midway 
through a run (at iteration 50) the fitness function changes to test the ability to adapt to a 
sudden change in task constraints or environment. 
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Table 1. Definitions and examples of terms. 
 
 
Table 2. A partial set of the templates used in the first fitness function. 
 
Learning. Invention makes use of the ability to learn trends and respond adaptively to 
them. Knowledge acquired through the evaluation of actions is translated into educated 
guesses about how to invent fit actions. For example, an agent may learn that symmetrical 
movement tends to be either beneficial or detrimental, and bias the generation of new actions 
accordingly. 
A Typical Run. Fitness and diversity of actions are initially low because all agents are 
initially immobile, implementing the same action, with all body parts in the neutral position. 
Soon some agent invents an action that has a higher fitness than immobility, and this action 
gets imitated, so fitness increases. Fitness increases further as other ideas get invented, 
assessed, implemented as actions, and spread through imitation. The diversity of actions 
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increases due to the proliferation of new ideas, and then decreases as agents hone in on the 
fittest actions. Thus, over successive rounds of invention and imitation, the agents’ actions 
improve. EVOC thereby models how “descent with modification” occurs in a purely cultural 
context. 
5.1 Method 
Modeling Chaining (First Transition). EVOC has been used to simulate a simple form of 
STR: the capacity to join representations together sequentially, which we refer to as chaining 
(so as not to convey the impression that it is a full-fledged model of the many ways in which 
STR could occur). 
Since our immediate goal was to investigate the impact of chaining (as opposed to 
faithfully rendering its underlying mechanisms in humans), in these simulations the capacity 
for chaining was simply turned on or off as opposed to coming about through the evolution of 
finer grained memory. Chaining gives agents the opportunity to execute multi-step actions. 
The agent can keep adding a new sub-action to its current action so long as the most recently-
added sub-action is both novel and successful. A sub-action D is considered novel if at least 
one of its components is different from that of the previous sub-action. It is considered 
successful if there exists a template Ti such that Φ(Ti, D) is one, as per equation 1. 
 
The fitness of an action consisting of more than one sub-action is obtained by adding 
the number of sub-actions to the fitness of the last sub-action in the sequence. For example, if 
the last sub-action of an action is D = [0, 1, −1, 1, −1, 1] and the number of sub-actions is 
seven, the fitness of the action is F(D) + 7 = 14 + 7 = 21. Thus where c is ‘with chaining’, w 
is ‘without chaining’, n is the number of chained sub-actions, the fitness of a chained action, 
Fc, is calculated as per equation 2. 
Fc = Fw + n                                                                 (2) 
An agent can execute an arbitrarily long action so long as it continues to invent 
successful new sub-actions. In general, the more sub-actions the fitter the action. Chaining is 
admittedly a simple form of RR, but the goal here was simply to test hypotheses about how 
the capacity for this kind of (by some definitions) recursive process operating at the 
individual level affects the dynamics at the societal level. 
Modeling Contextual Focus (Second Transition). Mathematical models both 
chaining of CF, and their impact on the global structure of the conceptual idea network or 
worldview, have been developed (Gabora & Aerts, 2009; Gabora & Steel, 2017), and the 
model of CF was consistent with experimental data from a study in which participants were 
asked to rate the typicality of exemplars of a concept for different contexts (Veloz, Gabora, 
Eyjolfson, & Aerts, 2011). CF was also incorporated into a portrait painting computer 
program generated artworks that humans preferred over those generated without CF (DiPaola 
& Gabora, 2009). However, the portrait painting program did not allow investigation of the 
effect of CF on the evolution of ideas through cultural interaction. Therefore, CF was also 
modeled using EVOC. In the convergent mode, the current action is only slightly modified to 
create a new action. In the divergent mode, the current action is substantially modified to 
create a new action. An agent switches between these modes by modifying its rate of creative 
change (RCC). If the fitness of its current action is low relative to previous actions, RCC 
increases, causing the agent to shift to a more divergent processing mode conducive to large 
(1) 
COGNITIVE TRANSITIONS CULTURAL EVOLUTION 16 
 
leaps through the space of possibilities. If action fitness is high relative to that of previous 
actions, RCC decreases, and the agent shifts to a more convergent mode conducive to minor 
adjustments. With CF turned off, RCC stays constant throughout the run at 1/6 (i.e., a new 
action involves change to one of the six body parts). The equation to modify RCC is shown in 
Equation 3. 
∆RCC = −a(Fnew − Fold)                                                      (3) 
Since at the start of a run previous fitness is undefined, RCC in this case is a function of 
the current fitness as per Equation 4, where 0 < b < 1. 
RCCinitial = bFcurrent                                                            (4) 
In the results shown here, a and b were initialized to -0.005 and 0.8 respectively. The 
implementation of neither chaining nor CF, chaining alone, CF alone, and both chaining and 
CF simultaneously, are schematically illustrated in panels a, b, c, and d, respectively of 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Schematic illustration of the algorithm without chaining or CF, with chaining only, and 
with both. 
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5.2 Results and Discussion 
The results of incorporating chaining and CF into the method by which agents generated 
cultural novelty are summarized in Table 3. The results of introducing chaining and CF on 
the mean fitness and diversity (total number of different actions) of actions across all agents 
in the society are shown in Figures 3 and 4 respectively.  
Figure 3. Mean fitness of cultural outputs across the society with both chaining and CF (red line), 
chaining only (dashed blue line), and neither chaining nor CF (dotted green line). Data are means of 
500 runs. To test the ability to respond to change in the task or environment, there was a change of 
fitness function at iteration 50. While chaining and CF were both beneficial, the capacity for major 
changes using CF was ultimately of little value without the ability to make minor refinements using 
chaining. The fact that CF was only beneficial following exposure to a new fitness function is 
consistent with its hypothesized role in facilitating new ways of thinking. 
 
 
Figure 4. Diversity of cultural outputs across the society with both chaining and CF (red line), 
chaining only (dashed blue line), and neither chaining nor CF (dotted green line). Data are means of 
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500 runs. To test ability to respond to change in task or environment there was a change of fitness 
function at iteration 50. As with fitness, while chaining and CF both increased diversity, their impact 
was different. While chaining consistently increased diversity, CF tended to exaggerate both the 
initial increase in diversity early on as the space of possibilities was being explored, and the latter 
decrease in diversity as agents converged on the fittest outputs. This is consistent with its 
hypothesized role in adjusting the mode of thought over the course of creative problem solving. 
 
Chaining and CF both significantly increased the mean fitness of actions. Without 
chaining, mean fitness quickly reached a plateau; with chaining, the space of possibilities 
became open-ended, and thus the fitness of cultural outputs could increase indefinitely. This 
is consistent with the hypothesis that chaining enabled the ratcheting of outputs necessary for 
cultural change to become an evolutionary process. Inspection revealed that although there is 
always convergence on optimal actions, without chained actions this set was static because 
the space of possibilities was finite, thus mean fitness plateaued. On the other hand, with 
chained actions the space of possibilities was not finite, and the set of optimal actions 
changed slowly but continuously as increasingly fit actions continued to be found. 
CF made a contribution to fitness above that of chaining alone. While chaining 
increased mean fitness throughout the run, CF was most effective following initial exposure 
to a new fitness function, i.e., at the beginning of the run or at iteration 50 when the fitness 
function changed. This supports CF’s hypothesized role in responding to radical change. 
When agents were first exposed to a fitness function, CF increased both the rate at which new 
possibilities were generated and the rate of convergence on the fittest of these. 
Both chaining and CF also significantly increased the diversity, or number of different 
actions, as shown in Figure 4. Chaining exaggerated both the initial increase in diversity as 
the space of possibilities was explored, and the subsequent decrease in diversity as agents 
converged on the fittest actions. As with fitness, CF alone exerted no noticeable effect on 
diversity once agents had fit actions. However, if chaining was already in place, CF made the 
inverted-U shaped pattern even more pronounced. The fact that CF had a negligible effect on 
fitness and diversity of actions unless chaining was already in place is consistent with the 
hypothesis that chaining arose first and CF arose second.  
Table 3. Summary of agent-based model results. 
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General Discussion 
We have outlined a speculative but coherent, multilevel explanation for how the the uniquely 
human capacity for collectively generated, open-ended, adaptive cultural evolution could 
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have come about. Although change occurred in a mosaic fashion in the Homo lineage over a 
period spanning more than two million years, the resulting overall pattern may be discerned 
as comprising two significant evolutionary transitions. First, the larger brain of H. erectus 
resulted in finer grained memory with detailed representations, paving the way for rehearsal 
of actions, refinement of skills, novel associations between closely related items in memory. 
This enabled STR, escape from episodic proximity, representational redescription (RR), 
minor improvements in cultural outputs, and a “cultural ratcheting” that expanded the 
capacity for open-ended cultural evolution. Much later, around 100,000 BP, newly-evolved 
basal ganglia circuits enabled onset of contextual focus: the ability to shift between 
convergent and divergent modes of thought, enabling hominins to process information from 
different perspectives and at multiple levels of detail. Hominins could now put their own spin 
on the ideas of others, adapting them to individual needs and tastes, leading to cumulative 
innovation. 
Thoughts, impressions, and attitudes could be modified by thinking about them in the 
context of each other, and they could be woven into an integrated “worldview” that defines 
who we are in relation to the world. This allowed the capacity for self expression, creating an 
environment conducive to the emergence of complex language, including grammar, 
recursion, word inflections, and syntactical structure, as well as comprehension. The proposal 
is consistent with findings that FOXP2 is associated with cognitive abilities that do not 
involve language, and with findings that non-language creative abilities arose at 
approximately the same time as complex language (Chrusch & Gabora, 2014). It is also 
consistent with findings that despite the existence of sophisticated cognitive abilities in other 
species such as birds (Emery, 2016), we alone exhibit cumulative cultural evolution. 
Cumulative cultural evolution may involve the ‘recycling’ of cortical maps such that cultural 
innovations invade evolutionarily older brain circuits and inherit some of their structural 
constraints (Dehaene, 2005; Lierberman, 2016). In short, we propose that the distinctive rich 
symbolism and grammatically complex language of the genus Homo reflect two evolutionary 
transitions brought about by novel forms of cognitive information processing. 
Many evolutionary approaches to the general question of how modern cognition arose 
have been devised in the last few decades, such as those of Wynn and Coolidge (e.g., Wynn 
et al, 2017) highlighting developmental psychology) and Bruner (e.g. 2010), highlighting 
palaeoneurology; we submit our approach as one of this array of modern evolutionary 
approaches to the same broad issue of the origins of BM. 
We presented archaeological evidence for the view that two cognitive transitions gave 
rise to two cultural transitions, as well as support for the proposed scenario obtained using an 
agent-based model of cultural evolution. Although such a model cannot provide proof it can 
play an important role in building a case by demonstrating the feasibility of the proposed 
mechanisms. Incorporating one kind of STR—chaining—into the computational model 
increased the fitness and diversity of cultural outputs, as well as the effectiveness of learning. 
The simulations, including the implementation of both chaining and CF, were simplistic; 
nevertheless the results suggest that once hominins became able to sequence thoughts 
together to generate increasingly complex and refined cultural outputs, and shift between 
different processing modes, they would have had a significant adaptive advantage. In future 
investigations we will use a sophisticated mathematical theory of concepts (Aerts, Gabora, & 
Sozzo, 2013) to develop a richer and more realistic model of cultural evolution. This will 
allow us to expand the simulation of STR to include not just chaining but also refinement of 
representations by viewing them from different contexts, and expand the simulation of the 
divergent mode of CF to incorporate the generation of new concept combinations. 
COGNITIVE TRANSITIONS CULTURAL EVOLUTION 21 
 
We note that models of the origins of culture and BM have long suffered from 
vagueness. For example, Donald (1991) and Mithen (1996) both propose that hominin 
cognitive evolution arose in stages, but are vague as to how and why these stages unfolded. 
The transitions to possession of the cognitive capacities that we propose made BM possible—
STR and CF—exhibit the defining characteristics of evolutionary transitions discussed in 
Section One, i.e., such transitions are rare, incomplete (did not ‘throw a switch’ resulting in 
immediate ‘turning on’ of BM), and involved new levels of organization. The increased 
sociality implied by the onset of STR and CF also meets Wilson’s expectation that 
evolutionary transitions drive “. . . the suppression of fitness differences within groups, 
causing between-group selection to become the primary evolutionary force” (Wilson, 2010). 
It is interesting that EVOC results support Griesmer’s (2000) hypothesis that a stage 
involving novel information complexity precedes stabilization mechanisms that ‘fix’ fit 
innovations as illustrated by the initial increase and subsequent decrease in cultural diversity. 
It may well be that early models of the origins of hominin culture were accurate, but 
not precise, and that present-day precision reflects an emerging ‘Extended Evolutionary 
Synthesis’ (Smith & Ruppell, 2011; Woese, 2004). The origins of BM are currently being 
rethought in light of wide dissatisfaction with an archaic ‘trait-list’ approach to its 
understanding (Ames, Riel-Salvatore, & Collins, 2013) and with new, nonlinear models of 
multifaceted cultural evolutionary change (Mesoudi, 2009; McDowell, 2013). We propose 
that the origins of BM can be considered in terms of an evolutionary transition in which new 
varieties of information were generated and handled—both within the mind and in artificial 
memory systems external to it—to the degree that new social arrangements appeared. 
Similarly, our theoretical arguments, and results obtained with EVOC, suggest that 
once humans became able to employ an exploratory, divergent processing mode when stuck, 
followed by a shift to a more constrained convergent processing mode to fine-tune their 
cultural outputs, they would have been capable of generating significantly more valuable 
cultural outputs. A potential pitfall of processing in a divergent mode is that since effort is 
devoted to the re-processing of previously learned material, less effort may be devoted to 
being on the lookout for danger and simply carrying out practical tasks. Since divergent 
thought carries a high cognitive load, it would not have been useful to think divergently until 
there was a means to shift back to a convergent mode. Although the EVOC results do not 
prove that onset of the capacity to chain thoughts together into sequences, and to shift 
between divergent modes of thought through CF, are responsible for our cultural complexity, 
it shows that they provide a computationally feasible explanation. We know of no other 
cognitive mechanisms implicated in the evolution of complex culture for which open-ended, 
adaptive cultural change has been demonstrated. 
 
References 
Agnoli S., Franchin L., Rubaltelli E., & Corazza G.E. 2015. An eye-tracking analysis of 
irrelevance processing as moderator of openness and creative performance. Creativity 
Research Journal, 27: 125-132. 
Aiello L. 1996. Hominin pre-adaptations for language and cognition. In Mellars P. & Gibson 
K. (eds): Modeling the early human mind, pp. 89-99. McDonald Institute Monographs, 
Cambridge. 
Ames C., Riel-Salvatore J., & Collins B. 2013. Why we need an alternative approach to the 
study of modern human behaviour. Can. J. Archaeol., 37:  21-47. 
Arbib M. 2011. From mirror neurons to complex imitation in the evolution of language and 
COGNITIVE TRANSITIONS CULTURAL EVOLUTION 22 
 
tool-use. Ann. Rev. Anthropol., 40: 257-273. 
Bak P., Tang C., & Weisenfeld K. 1987. Self-organized criticality. Physical Rev., 38: 364. 
Barrett H., & Kurzban R. 2006. Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate. Psychol. Rev., 
113: 628-647. 
Barsalou L.W. 2005. Abstraction as dynamic interpretation in perceptual symbol systems. In 
Gershkoff-Stowe L. & Rakison D. (eds): Building object categories (pp. 389-431). 
Earlbaum, Carnegie Symposium Series. 
Basadur M. 1995. The power of innovation. Pitman, New York. 
Bickerton D. 2014. More than nature needs: Language, mind and evolution. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Bickerton D. & Szathmáry E. 2009. Biological foundations and origin of syntax. MIT Press, 
Cambridge. 
Blackwell L. & d’Errico F. 2001. Evidence of termite foraging by Swartkrans early 
Hominins. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., 98: 1358-1363. 
Bloom P. 2000. Language and thought: Does grammar makes us smart? Curr. Biol., 10: 516-
517. 
Braun D., Plummer T., Ditchfield P., Ferraro J., Maina D., Bishop L. & Potts R. 2008. 
Oldowan behavior and raw material transport: perspectives from the Kanjera 
Formation. J. Archaeol. Sci., 35: 2329-2345. 
Bruner E. 2010. The evolution of the parietal cortical areas in the human genus; between 
structure and cognition. In Broadfield, D., M. Yuan, K. Schick & N. Toth (eds) The 
Human Brain Evolving: Paleoneurological Studies in Honor of Ralph L. Holloway, pp. 
83-96. Stone Age Institute Press, Gosport, Indiana. 
Byrne R. & Russon A. 1998. Learning by imitation: A hierarchical approach. Behav. Brain 
Sci., 2: 667-721. 
Byrne R. 2005. The maker not the tool: The cognitive significance of great ape manual skills. 
In V. Roux & B. Bril (eds): Stone knapping: The necessary conditions for a uniquely 
Hominin behaviour, pp. 159-169. McDonald Institute of Archaeological Research, 
Cambridge. 
Calcott B. & Sterelny K. 2011. The major transitions in evolution revisited. Vienna Series 
Theor. Biol.. MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Call J. & Tomasello M. 2008. Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later. 
Trends Cogn. Sci., 12: 187-192. 
Carstairs-McCarthy A. 1999. The origins of complex language. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Chabris C., Hebert B., Benjamin D., Beauchamp J., Cesarini D., van der Loos M., 
Johannesson M., Magnusson P., Lichtenstein P., Atwood C., Freese J., Hauser T., 
Hauser R., Christakis N., & Laibson D. 2012. Most reported genetic associations with 
general intelligence are probably false positives. Psychol. Sci., 23: 1314-1323. 
Christiansen M. & Chater N. 2008. Language as shaped by the brain. Behav. Brain Sci., 31: 
489-558. 
Christiansen M., & Kirby S. 2003. Language evolution: Consensus and controversies. Trends 
COGNITIVE TRANSITIONS CULTURAL EVOLUTION 23 
 
in Cognitive Sciences, 7: 300-307.  
Chrusch C. & Gabora L. 2014. A tentative role for FOXP2 in the evolution of dual 
processing modes and generative abilities. Proc. 36th Ann. Mtng. Cogn. Sci. Soc., 
pp.499-504. Cognitive Science Society, Austin. 
Clark A. 2001. Reasons, robots and the extended mind. Mind Lang., 16: 121-145. Corballis 
M. 2004a. FOXP2 and the mirror system. Trends Cogn. Sci., 8: 95-96. 
Corballis M. 2004b. The origins of modernity: Was autonomous speech the critical factor? 
Psychol. Rev., 111: 543-552. 
Corballis M. 2011. The recursive mind: The origins of human language, thought, and 
civilization. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Cosmides L., & Tooby J. (1992). Cognitive adaptations for social exchange. In Barkow, J.H., 
Cosmides L., & Tooby J. (eds): The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the 
generation of culture, pp. 163-228. Oxford University Press, USA. 
Cropley A. & Sikand J. 1973. Creativity and schizophrenia. J. Consult. Clin. Psych., 40: 462-
468. 
Crow T. 2012. Schizophrenia as variation in the sapiens-specific epigenetic instruction to the 
embryo. Clin. Genet., 81: 319-324. 
Davidson I. & Noble W. 1989. The archaeology of perception: Traces of depiction and 
language. Curr. Anthropol., 30: 125-155. 
Deacon T. 1997. The symbolic species: The Coevolution of Language and the Brain. Norton, 
New York. 
Dehaene S. 2005. Evolution of human cortical circuits for reading and arithmetic: The 
“neuronal recycling" hypothesis. In Dehaene S., Duhamel J., Hauser M. & Rozzolatto 
G. (eds): From monkey brain to human brain, pp.133-157. MIT Press, Cambridge. 
D’Errico F., Henshilwood C., Lawson G., Canhaeren M., Tillier A., Soressi M., Bresson F., 
Maureville B., Nowell A., Lakarra J., Blackwell L. & Julien M. 2003. 
Archaeological evidence for the emergence of language, symbolism and music: An 
alternative multidisciplinary perspective. J. World Prehist., 17: 1-70. 
D’Errico F., Henshilwood C., Vanhaeren M. & van Niekerk K. 2005. Nassarius kraussianus 
shell beads from Blombos Cave: evidence for symbolic behavior in the Middle Stone 
Age. J. Hum. Evol., 48: 3-24. 
D’Errico F., Vanhaerenc M., Bartond N., Bouzouggar A., Mienis H., Richter D., Hublin J., 
McPherron S.P. & Lozouet P. 2009. Additional evidence on the use of personal 
ornaments in the Middle Paleolithic of North Africa. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., 106: 
16051-16056. 
DiPaola S. & Gabora L. 2009. Incorporating characteristics of human creativity into an 
evolutionary art algorithm. Genet. Program. Evol. M., 10: 97-110. 
DeLong J.P., Okie J., Moses M,. Silby R. & Brown J. 2010. Shifts in metabolic scaling, 
production, and efficiency across major evolutionary transitions of life. Proc. Natl. 
Acad. Sci., 107: 12941-12945. 
Donald M. 1991. Origins of the modern mind: Three stages in the evolution of culture and 
cognition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
COGNITIVE TRANSITIONS CULTURAL EVOLUTION 24 
 
Dugatkin L. 2001. Imitation factor: Imitation in animals and the origin of human culture. 
Free Press, New York. 
Dunbar R. 1993. Coevolution of neocortical size, group size, and language in humans. Behav. 
Brain Sci., 16: 681-735. 
Emery N. 2016. An Exploration of avian intelligence. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Enard W., Przeworski M., Fisher S., Lai C., Weibe V. & Kitano T. 2002. Molecular evolution 
of FOXP2, a gene involved in speech and language. Nature, 418: 869-872. 
Erlandson J. 2001. The archaeology of aquatic adaptations: Paradigms for a new millennium. 
J Anthropol. Res., 9: 287-350.  
Evans J. 2008. Dual-process accounts of reasoning, judgment and social cognition. Ann. Rev. 
Psychol., 59: 255-278. 
Evans N. & Levinson S. 2009. The myth of language universals: Language diversity and its 
importance for cognitive science. Behav. Brain Sci., 32: 429-492. 
Fauconnier G. & Turner M. 2002. The way we think: Conceptual blending and the mind’s 
hidden complexities. Basic Books, New York. 
Chan, J., & Schunn, C. 2015. The impact of analogies on creative concept generation: 
Lessons from an in vivo study in engineering design. Cognitive Science, 39: 126-155. 
Feinstein, J.S. 2006. The nature of creative development. Stanford University Press, Stanford. 
Finke R., Ward T. & Smith S. 1992. Creative cognition: Theory, research, and applications. 
MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Fisher S. & Ridley M. 2013. Culture, genes, and the human revolution. Science, 340: 929-
930. 
Fisher S. & Scharff C. 2009. FOXP2 as a molecular window into speech and language. 
Trends Genet., 25: 166-177. 
Foley R. & Gamble C. 2009. The ecology of social transitions in human evolution. Philos. 
Trans. R. Soc. B, 364: 3267-3279. 
Forrest S. & Mitchell M. 1993. Relative building block fitness and the building block 
hypothesis. In L. Whitley (ed): Foundations of Genetic Algorithms. Morgan Kaufman, 
Burlington MA. 
Fuentes A. 2015. Evolution of human behavior. Oxford University Press, New York. 
Finke R., Ward T. & Smith S. 1992. Creative Cognition: Theory, Research, and 
Applications. MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Gabora L. 1995. Meme and variations: A computer model of cultural evolution. In Nadel L. 
& Stein D. (eds): 1993 Lectures in Complex Systems,  pp.471-486. Addison-Wesley, 
Boston. 
Gabora L. 2002. Cognitive mechanisms underlying the creative process. In Proceedings of 
the 4th conference on creativity & cognition, pp. 126-133. Association for Computing 
Machinery, New York. 
Gabora L. 2003. Contextual focus: A cognitive explanation for the cultural transition of the 
Middle/Upper Paleolithic. Proc. Ann. Conf. Cogn. Sci. Soc., pp.432-437. Lawrence 
Erlbaum, Mahwah NJ. 
COGNITIVE TRANSITIONS CULTURAL EVOLUTION 25 
 
Gabora L. 2010. Revenge of the ’neurds’: Characterizing creative thought in terms of the 
structure and dynamics of human memory. Creativity Res. J., 22: 1-13. 
Gabora L. 2013. An evolutionary framework for cultural change: Selectionism versus 
communal exchange. Physics of Life Reviews, 10(2): 117-145. 
Gabora L. 2017. Honing theory: A complex systems framework for creativity. Nonlinear 
Dynamics, Psychology, and Life Sciences, 21: 35-88. 
Gabora L. (2018). The neural basis and evolution of divergent and convergent thought. In 
Vartanian O. & Jung R. (eds): The Cambridge handbook of the neuroscience of 
creativity. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Gabora L. & Aerts D. 2009. A mathematical model of the emergence of an integrated 
worldview. J. Math. Psychol., 53: 434-451. 
Gabora L., & Ranjan A. (2013). How insight emerges in distributed, content-addressable 
memory. In A. Bristol, O. Vartanian, & J. Kaufman (Eds.) The neuroscience of 
creativity, pp. 19-43. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Galis F. & Metz J. 2007. Evolutionary novelties: The making and breaking of pleiotropic 
constraints. Integr. Comp. Biol., 47: 409-419. 
Garfield J., Peterson C. & Perry T. 2001. Social cognition, language acquisition and the 
development of the theory of mind. Mind Lang., 16: 494-541. 
Garofoli D. 2016. Cognitive archaeology without behavioral modernity: An eliminativist 
attempt. In: Iliopoulos A & Garofoli D (eds.): "The material dimensions of cognition”. 
Quatern. Int., 405(Part A): 125-135. 
Geels F. 2002. Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfiguration processes: a multi-
level perspective and a case-study. Research Policy, 31: 1257-1274. 
Gibbons A. 1998. Ancient island tools suggest Homo erectus was a seafarer. Science, 297: 
1635-1637. 
Griesmer J. 2000. The units of evolutionary transitions. Selection, 1: 67-80. 
Gould S. 2002. The structure of evolutionary theory. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
Goren-Inbar N., Alperson N., Kiselv M., Simchoni O., Melamed Y., Ben-Nun A. & Werker 
E. 2004. Evidence of Hominin control of fire at Gesher Benot Ya‚Äôaqov, Israel. 
Science, 304: 725-727. 
Godfrey-Smith P. 2011. Darwinian populations and transitions in individuality. In Calcott B. 
& Sterelny K. (eds): The major evolutionary transitions revisited. Vienna series in 
theoretical biology, pp. 65-81. MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Haidle M. 2009. How to think a simple spear. In S.A. deBaune, F.L. Coolidge & T. Wynn 
(eds): Cognitive archaeology and human evolution, pp.57-73. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Haidle M. 2015. The nature of culture: An eight-grade model for the evolution and expansion 
of cultural capacities in hominins and other animals. J. Anthropol. Sci., 93: 43-70. 
Harmand S., Lewis J., Feibel C., Lepre C., Prat S., Lenoble A., · · · & Taylor N. 2015. 3.3-
million-year-old stone tools from Lomekwi 3, West Turkana, Kenya. Nature, 521: 310-
315. 
Hauser M., Chomsky N., & Fitch W. 2002. The faculty of language: What is it, who has it 
COGNITIVE TRANSITIONS CULTURAL EVOLUTION 26 
 
and how did it evolve? Science, 298: 1569-1579. 
Henrich J. & Boyd R. 2002. On modeling cognition and culture: Why replicators are not 
necessary for cultural evolution. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 2:  87-112.  
Herrmann E., Call J., Hernandez-Lloredo M., Hare B. & Tomasello M. 2007. Humans have 
evolved specialized skills of social cognition: The cultural intelligence hypothesis. 
Science, 317: 1360-1366. 
Heyes C. 1998. Theory of mind in nonhuman primates. Behav. Brain Sci, 211: 104-134. 
Heyes C. 2012. New thinking: The evolution of human cognition. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B, 367: 
2091-2096. 
Higgs P. 2000. The mimetic transition: A simulation study of the evolution of learning by 
imitation. Proc. R. Soc. B: Biol. Sci., 267: 1355-1361. 
Hinton G. & Nowlan S. 1987. How learning can guide evolution. Compl. Syst., 1: 495-502. 
Hovers E., Lani S., Bar-Yosef O. & Vandermeersch B. 2003. An early case of color 
symbolism: Ochre use by modern humans in Qafzeh Cave. Curr. Anthropol., 44: 491-
522. 
Hutchins E., & Hazelhurst B. 1991. Learning in the cultural process. In Langton C., Taylor J., 
Farmer D. & Rasmussen S. (eds): Artificial Life II. Addison-Wesley, Boston. 
Karmiloff-Smith A. 1992. Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive 
Science. MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Kauffman S. 1993. Origins of Order. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Klein S., Cosmides L., Tooby J. & Chance S. 2002. Decisions and the evolution of memory: 
Multiple systems, multiple functions. Psychol. Rev., 109: 306-329. 
Kovas Y. & Polmin R. 2006. Generalist genes: implications for the cognitive sciences. 
Trends Cogn. Sci., 10: 198-203. 
Kovac I., Gopnik M. & Palmour R. 2006. Sibling resemblance for specific components of 
linguistic competence in families of speech/language impaired children. J. 
Neurolinguist., 15: 497-513. 
Kurt S., Fisher S. & Ehret G. 2012. FOXP2 mutations impair auditory-motor association 
learning. PloSOne, 7: 1-5. 
Kuttner R., Lorincz A. & Swan D. 1967. The schizophrenia gene and social evolution. 
Psychol. Rep., 20: 407-412. 
Lai C., Fisher S., Hurst J., Vargha-Khadem F. & Monaco A. 2001. A forkhead-domain gene 
is mutated in a severe speech and language disorder. Nature, 413: 519-523. 
Lalmansingh A., Karmakar S., Jin Y. & Nagaich A. 2012. Multiple modes of chromatin 
remodeling by Forkhead box proteins. Biochimica et Biophysica Acta, 1819: 707-745. 
Leaf M. & Read D. 2012. Human thought and social organization: Archaeology on a new 
plane. Lexington Publishers, Guilford, CT. 
Lieberman L. 2016. The evolution of language and thought. J. Anthropol. Sci., 94: 127-146. 
Leijnen S. & Gabora L. 2009. How creative should creators be to optimize the evolution of 
ideas? A computational model. Electronic Proc. Theor. Comp. Sci., 9: 108-119. 
Lepre C., Roche H., Kent D., Harmand S., Quinn R., Brugal J., Texier P., Lenoble A. & 
COGNITIVE TRANSITIONS CULTURAL EVOLUTION 27 
 
Feibel C. 2011. An earlier origin for the Acheulian. Nature, 477: 82-85. 
Mania D. & Mania U. 2005. The natural and socio-cultural environment of Homo erectus at 
Bilzingsleben, Germany. In Gamble C. (ed): The individual Hominid in context:  
Archaeological investigations of Lower and Middle Palaeolithic landscapes, locales, 
and artifacts, pp. 98-114. Psychology Press, Hove, UK. 
McBrearty S. & Brooks A. 2000. The revolution that wasn’t: A new interpretation of the 
origin of modern human behavior. J. Hum. Evol., 39: 453-563. 
McDowell J. 2013. A quantitative evolutionary theory of adaptive behavior dynamics. 
Psychol. Rev., 120: 731-750. 
Mesoudi A. 2009. How cultural evolutionary theory can inform social psychology and vice 
versa. Psychol. Rev., 116: 929-952. 
Mesoudi A., Whiten A. & Laland K.N. 2006. Towards a unified science of cultural evolution. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 29:  329-383. 
Mithen S. 1996. The Prehistory of the Mind: The Cognitive Origins of Art, Religion and 
Science. Thames and Hudson Press, London. 
Mithen S. 1998. Creativity in Human Evolution and Prehistory. Routledge, Abingdon-on-
Thames. 
Mellars P. 2006. Going East: New genetic and archaeological perspectives on the modern 
human colonization of Eurasia. Science, 313: 796-800. 
Morgan A. 2013. Speech-language pathology insights into genetics and neuroscience: 
Beyond surface behaviour. Int. J. Speech-Lang. Pathol., 15: 245-254. 
Moutsou T. 2014. The Obsidian Evidence for the Scale of Social Life During the 
Palaeolithic. British Archaeological Reports, Oxford. 
Mulvaney J. & Kamminga J. 1999. Prehistory of Australia. Smithsonian Institution Scholarly 
Press, Washington. 
Nelson S. 2008. Diversity of the upper Palaeolithic Venus figurines and archaeological 
mythology. Arch. P. Amer. Anth. Assoc., 2: 11-22. 
Nosek B. 2007. Implicit-explicit relations. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci., 16: 65-69. 
Otte M. 2012. The management of space during the Palaeolithic. Quatern. Int., 247: 212-229. 
Parker J. 2004. A major evolutionary transition to more than two sexes? Trends Ecol. Evol., 
19: 83-86. 
Parfitt S., Ashton N., Lewis S., Abel R., Cooper G., Field M., Gale R., Hoare P., Larkin N., 
Lewis M., Karloukivski V., Maher B., Peglar S., Preece R., Whittaker 
J. & Stringer C. 2010. Early Pleistocene human occupation at the edge of the boreal zone in 
northwest Europe. Nature, 466: 229-233.  
Penn D., Holyoak K. & Povinelli D. 1993. Darwin’s mistake: Explaining the discontinuity 
between human and nonhuman minds. Behav. Brain Sci., 31: 109-178. 
Pike A., Hoffmann D., García-Diez M., Pettitt P., Alcolea J., De Balbin R. & Zilhão J. 2012. 
U-series dating of Paleolithic art in 11 caves in Spain. Science, 336: 1409-1413. 
Plummer T. 2004. Flaked stones and old bones: Biological and cultural evolution at the dawn 
of technology. Yearbook Physical Anthropol., 47: 118-164. 
COGNITIVE TRANSITIONS CULTURAL EVOLUTION 28 
 
Porr M. 2014. Essential questions: Modern humans and the capacity for modernity. In R. 
Dennell & M. Porr (eds): Southern Asia, Australia and the search for human prigins, 
pp. 257-264. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Potts R. 2012. Environmental and behavioral evidence pertaining to the evolution of early 
Homo. Curr. Anthropol., 53: S299-S317. 
Premack D. 2007. Human and animal cognition: Continuity and discontinuity. Proc. Natl. 
Acad. Sci. USA, 104: 13861-13867. 
Rappaport R. 1999. Ritual and religion in the making of humanity. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
Reimers-Kipping S., Hevers W., Paabo S. & Enard W. 2011. Humanized Foxp2 specifically 
affects cortico-basal ganglia circuits. Neuroscience, 175: 75-84. 
Read D. 2008. Working memory: A cognitive limit to non-human primate recursive thinking 
prior to hominid evolution. Evol. Psych., 6(4): 603-638. 
Read D. 2010. From Experiential-Based to Relational-Based Forms of Social Organization: 
A Major Transition in the Evolution of Homo sapiens. In Dunbar R., Gamble C. & 
Gowlett J. (eds): Social brain, distributed mind (pp. 203-234). Oxford University Press: 
Oxford. 
Read D. 2013. Modeling cultural idea systems: The relationship between theory models and 
data models. Perspectives on Science, 21: 157-174.  
Read D. 2016. How culture makes us human: Primate social evolution and the formation of 
human societies. Routledge. 
Read D., Lane D. & van der Leeuw S. 2009. The innovation innovation. In Lane D., Pumain 
D., van der Leeuw S.E. & West G. (eds). Complexity perspectives in innovation and 
social change, pp. 43-84. Springer, Netherlands. 
Read D. & van der Leeuw S. 2015. The extension of social relations in time and space during 
the Palaeolithic period and beyond. In Wenban-Smith, F. Coward, F., Hosfield R. & 
Pope M. (eds): Settlement, society and cognition in human  evolution, pp. 31-53. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Rogers A.R. 1988. Does biology constrain culture? American Anthropologist,  90: 819-831. 
Schultz T. & Brady S. 2008. Major evolutionary transitions in ant agriculture. Proc. Natl. 
Acad. Sci., 105: 5435-5440. 
Schwartz J.H. 2016. What constitutes Homo sapiens? Morphology versus received wisdom. 
J. Anthropol. Sci., 94: 65-80-146. 
Sell A., Cosmides L., Tooby J. Sznycer D., Von Rueden C., and Gurven M. 2009. Human 
adaptations for the visual assessment of strength and fighting ability from the body and 
face. Proc. R. Soc. London B. 276:  575-584. 
Shea J. 2011. Homo sapiens is as Homo sapiens was: Behavioral variability versus 
“behavioral modernity” in Paleolithic archaeology. Curr. Anthropol., 52: 1-35. 
Siegal M., Varley R., & Want S. 2001. Mind over grammar: Reasoning in aphasia and 
development. Trends Cogn. Sci., 5: 296-301. 
Smith C. & Ruppell J. 2011. What anthropologists should know about the new evolutionary 
synthesis. Structure Dynamics, 5: 1-13. 
COGNITIVE TRANSITIONS CULTURAL EVOLUTION 29 
 
Smith C.M. 2013. Comment on ’An evolutionary framework for cultural change; 
Selectionism versus communal exchange’. Physics of Life Reviews 10: 156-157. 
Sowden P., Pringle A. & Gabora L. 2014. The shifting sands of creative thinking: 
Connections to dual process theory. Think. Reasoning, 21: 40-60. 
Stanley S. 1979. Macroevolution: Pattern and process. W.H. Freeman and Co, New York. 
Steels L, ed. 2012. Experiments in Cultural Language Evolution. John Benjamins, 
Amsterdam. 
Suddendorf T., Addis D. & Corballis M. 2009. Mental time travel and the shaping of the 
human mind. Philos. T. R. Soc. B., 364:  317-24. 
Szathmary E., & Smith J. 1995. The major evolutionary transitions. Nature, 374: 227-232. 
Szathmary E. 2015. Toward major evolutionary transitions theory 2.0. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci., 
112: 10104-10111. 
Tattersall I. 2016. A tentative framework for the acquisition of language and modern human 
cognition. J. Anthropol. Sci., 94: 157-166. 
Tolossa A., Sanjuan J., Dagnall A., Molto M., Herrero N. & de Frutos R. 2010. FOXP2 gene 
and language impairment in schizophrenia: association and epigenetic studies. BMC 
Med. Genet., 11: 114. 
Tomasello M. 1999. The cultural origins of human cognition. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Tomasello M., Kruger A. & Ratner H. 1993. Cultural learning. Behav. Brain Sci., 16: 495-
552. 
Tomasello M. 2014. A natural history of human thinking. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Tooby J. & Cosmides L. 1989. Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culure part I: 
Theoretical considerations. Ethology and Sociobiology 10: 29-49. 
Vartanian O. 2009. Variable attention facilitates creative problem solving. Psychology of 
Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 3: 57-59.  
Veloz T., Gabora L., Eyjolfson M. & Aerts D. 2011. Toward a formal model of the shifting 
relationship between concepts and contexts in different modes of thought. Lecture notes 
in computer science 7052: Proc. international symposium on quantum interaction, pp. 
25-34. Springer, Berlin. 
Vicario C. 2013. FOXP2 gene and language development: the molecular substrate of the 
gestural-origin theory of speech? Front. Behav. Neurosci., 7: 1-3. 
Villmoare B. et al. 2015. Early Homo at 2.8 Ma from Ledi-Geraru, Afar, Ethiopia Science, 
347: 1352-1355. 
Wiessner P. 2014. The embers of society: Firelight talk among the Juhoansi bushmen. Proc. 
Nat. Acad. Sci. USA, 111: 14027–14035. 
Whiten A. 2011. The scope of culture in chimpanzees, humans and ancestral apes. Philos. T. 
R. Soc. B, 366: 997-1007. 
Wilson D. 2010. Multilevel selection and major transitions. In Pigliucci M. & Miller G.B. 
(eds): Evolution: The extended synthesis, pp.81-93. MIT Press, Cambridge. 
COGNITIVE TRANSITIONS CULTURAL EVOLUTION 30 
 
Woese C. 2004. A new biology for a new century. Microbiol. Mol. Biol. R., 68: 173-186. 
Wolfradt U. & Pretz J. 2001. Individual differences in creativity: Personality, story writing, 
and hobbies. Eur. J. Personality, 15: 297-310. 
Wragg-Sykees R. 2015. To see a world in a hafted tool: Birch pitch composite technology, 
cognition and memory in Neanderthals. In Coward F., Hosfeild R. Pope M. &Wenban-
Smith F.(eds): Settlement, society and cognition in human evolution: Landscapes in the 
mind, pp. 117-137. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Wynn T., Overmann K.A., Coolidge F.L. & Janulis K. 2017. Bootstraping ordinal thinking. 
In Wynn, T. & Coolidge F.L. (eds): Cognitive models in Palaeolithic archaeology, pp. 
197-213. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Zabelina D. 2018. Attention and creativity. In Vartanian O. & Jung R. (eds): The Cambridge 
handbook of the neuroscience of creativity. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
MA. 
Zhang J., Webb D. & Podlaha O. 2002. Accelerated protein evolution and origins of human-
specific features: FOXP2 as an example. Genetics, 162: 1825-1835. 
 
Acknowledgments 
This work was supported by a grant (62R06523) to the first author from the Natural Sciences 
and Engineering Research Council of Canada. 
  
Appendix A:  
Training the Neural Network 
The neural network starts with small random weights between input/output nodes. Weights 
between hidden nodes, and weights between hidden nodes and input/output nodes, are fixed 
at +/- 1.0. Patterns that represent ideas for actions are learned by training for 50 iterations 
using the generalized delta rule with a sigmoid activation function (Rumelhart & McClelland 
1986). Since the network is an auto-associator training continues until the output matches the 
input. The relevant variables are: 
ai = activation of j 
tj = jth component of input 
wij = weight on link from i to j 
β = 0.15 
θ = 0.5 
                                                  (5) 
For the movement node, we use the absolute value of ai (since negative movement is 
not possible; the least you can move is to not move at all). The comparison between input and 
output involves computing an error term, which is used to modify the pattern of connectivity 
in the network such that its responses become more correct. For input/output units the error 
term is computed as follows: 
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δj = (tj − aj)aj(1 − aj)                                                     (6) 
For hidden units the error term is computed as follows: 
δi = aj (1 − aj)∑ δjwij                                                      (7) 
 
Appendix B: 
Calculating the Fitness of a Template 
Assume that D is a sub-action (i.e., D = dj; j = 1..6) and Ti is the ith template (i.e., Ti = tij ; j = 
1..6). Thus, dj represents the position of the jth body part and the value of dj can be either 0 
(neutral), 1 (up), or -1 (down). Likewise, the value of tij can be 0, 1, -1, or * (unspecified). 
Accordingly, the fitness of sub-action D is obtained as per Eq. 8. 
                                            (8) 
As shown in this equation, fitness is a function of template weight (Φ(Ti, D)) and 
template order (Ω(Ti)). 
Template Weight 
Φ(Ti, D) is a function that determines the weight of sub-action D by comparing it with 
template Ti. This weight is set to one if each component of the sub-action (i.e., dj ; j = 1..6) 
either matches the corresponding component of the template (i.e., tij ; j = 1..6) or if the 
corresponding components of the template is unspecified (i.e., tij = ∗): 
                                    (9) 
Template Order 
Ω(Ti) computes the order of the template Ti by counting the number of components that have 
a specified value (i.e., ti /= ∗). 
                                                         (10) 
The optimal sub-actions are {0, 1, −1, 1, −1, 1}, {0, 1, −1, 1, −1, −1}, {0, −1, 1, −1, 1, 
1}, and {0, −1, 1, −1, 1, −1}. 
